Hannu Vartiainen
نویسندگان
چکیده
We study coalitional one-deviation principle in a framework à la Chwe (1994). The principle requires that an active coalition or any of its subcoalition will not benefit from a single deviation to a strategy that specifies, for each history of coalitional moves, an active coalition and its move. A strategy meeting the one-deviation property is characterized. Moreover, it is shown to exist. Finally, the results are compared to the existing theories of coalitional games. JEL Classification: C71, C72
منابع مشابه
Hannu Vartiainen ― Klaus Kultti Multilateral Non-cooperative Bargaining in a General Utility Space Aboa Centre for Economics Hannu Vartiainen ― Klaus Kultti Multilateral Non-cooperative Bargaining in a General Utility Space
We consider an n-player bargaining problem where the utility possibility set is compact, convex, and stricly comprehensive. We show that a stationary subgame perfect Nash equilibrium exists, and that, if the Pareto surface is differentiable, all such equilibria converge to the Nash bargaining solution as the length of a time period between offers goes to zero. Without the differentiability assu...
متن کاملCOPYRIGHT NOTICE: Edited by Peter Diamond & Hannu Vartiainen: Behavioral Economics and Its Applications
is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, © 2007, by Princeton University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users ar...
متن کاملOne-deviation principle and dynamic voting∗
We study collective choice via an endogenous agenda setting process. At each stage, a status quo is implemented unless it is replaced by a majority (winning coalition) with a new status quo outcome. The process continues until the prevailing status quo is no longer challenged. We impose a one-time deviation restriction on the feasible policy processes, reflecting farsightedness of voters. The k...
متن کاملDynamic stable set as a tournament solution ∗ Hannu
We define a notion of dynamic (vNM) stable set for a tournament relation. Dynamic stable set satisfies (i) an external direct stability property, and (ii) an internal indirect stability property. Importantly, stability criteria are conditioned on the histories of past play, i.e. the dominance system has memory. Due to the asymmetry of the defining stability criteria, a dynamic stable set is sta...
متن کاملOn the number of pure Nash equilibria in random two-person games
We study pure Nash equilibria in random two player games, when best replies may be multi valued. We first show that, when all best reply correpondences are equally likely, the probability of at least one pure Nash equilibrium approaches one, and the expected number of pure Nash equilibria approaches infinity, when the size of the game becomes large. We then study the case where the utilities of...
متن کامل