Surplus Extraction on Arbitrary Type Spaces
نویسنده
چکیده
In this paper I study the possibility of full surplus extraction on arbitrary type spaces, with three main results: (i) I characterize full surplus extraction, (ii) I characterize full surplus extraction assuming that the surplus-extracting allocation is implementable, and (iii) I show that virtually full surplus extraction implies full surplus extraction. The characterizing condition in (ii) above is equivalent to McAfee and Reny’s (1992a) condition in their restricted environment. Since they only characterized virtually full surplus extraction, it follows that their proposed mechanisms incur a loss relative to the direct mechanisms studied here, with which full surplus extraction is possible. JEL Classification: C62, D71, D82.
منابع مشابه
The generic possibility of full surplus extraction in models with large type spaces
McAfee and Reny (1992) have given a necessary and sufficient condition for full surplus extraction in naive type spaces with a continuum of payoff types. We generalize their characterization to arbitrary abstract type spaces and to the universal type space and show that in each setting, full surplus extraction is generically possible. We interpret the McAfee-Reny condition as a much stronger ve...
متن کاملOn the Generic (Im)possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design∗
A number of studies, most notably Crémer and McLean (1985, 1988), have shown that in generic type spaces that admit a common prior and are of a fixed finite size, an uninformed seller can design mechanisms that extract all the surplus from privatelyinformed bidders. We show that this result hinges on the non-convexity of such a family of priors. When the ambient family of priors is convex, gene...
متن کاملRent Extraction with Rich Type Spaces∗
We characterize Revenue Maximizing Mechanisms in auction settings with `rich' type spaces where bidders obtain information from sources other than their own valuation. The focus of the paper is on the concept of weak Bayes-Nash implementation. By considering a relaxed problem, we provide an upper bound on Revenue Extraction that explicitly builds upon the richness of the information structure. ...
متن کاملBetting on Others’ Bets: Unions of Surplus Extraction Mechanisms
We construct the generalized Crémer-McLean mechanism where i’s participation fee depends not only on the valuations reported by −i at the second stage, but also on the choice of the participation fee by −i at the first stage. Such construction allows to exploit the convex hull property of beliefs whenever it appears in beliefs about beliefs rather than in beliefs about preferences. As such bett...
متن کاملOn Generalized Injective Spaces in Generalized Topologies
In this paper, we first present a new type of the concept of open sets by expressing some properties of arbitrary mappings on a power set. With the generalization of the closure spaces in categorical topology, we introduce the generalized topological spaces and the concept of generalized continuity and become familiar with weak and strong structures for generalized topological spaces. Then, int...
متن کامل