Evolution of Interdependent Preferences in Aggregative Games

We study the evolution of preference interdependence in aggregative games which are symmetric with respect to material payo¤s but asymmetric with respect to player objective functions. We identify a class of aggregative games whose equilibria have the property that the players with interdependent preferences (who care not only about their own material payo¤s but also about their payo¤s relative to others) earn strictly higher material payo¤s than do the material payo¤ maximizers. Included in the class are common pool resource and public good games. If each member of the population interacts with each other member (the playing-the-...eld model), we show that any evolutionary selection dynamic satisfying a weak payo¤ monotonicity condition implies that only interdependent preferences can survive in the long run. JEL Classi...cation: C72, D62.