Provable Security Support for the Skein Hash Family
نویسنده
چکیده
منابع مشابه
Security Analysis and Comparison of the SHA-3 Finalists BLAKE, Grøstl, JH, Keccak, and Skein
In 2007, the US National Institute for Standards and Technology announced a call for the design of a new cryptographic hash algorithm in response to the vulnerabilities identified in widely employed hash functions, such as MD5 and SHA-1. NIST received many submissions, 51 of which got accepted to the first round. At present, 5 candidates are left in the third round of the competition. An import...
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