Anger And Positive Emotions In Political Protest *

r e s u M e n En este estudio se analiza el papel de las emociones en la protesta política. En los modelos actuales, la ira es la única emoción que se asocia a esas acciones. Sin embargo, los autores creen que no es la única emoción que moviliza a la ciudadanía, por ello afirman que junto a ella deben existir otras de valencia positiva. En este estudio participaron 316 estudiantes universitarios a los que se les preguntó por su intención de movilizarse en contra de los recortes en educación. Los resultados muestran que la ira correlaciona de manera significativa con las emociones positivas. Además el análisis de mediación muestra la relevancia de las emociones positivas para explicar las intenciones de protesta y que la influencia de la ira sobre la intención de participar se realiza fundamentalmente a través de las emociones positivas. Se discute el papel de las emociones y la necesidad de ampliar los motivos de participación. Palabras clave Emociones positivas; ira; protesta política; recortes en educación doi:10.11144/Javeriana.UPSY13-3.apep Para citar este artículo: Sabucedo, J. M., & Vilas, X. (2014). Anger and positive emotions in political protest. Universitas Psychologica, 13(3), 829-838. http://dx.doi.org/10.11144/Javeriana.UPSY13-3. apep * With financial support from the Galician Department of Culture, Education, and Universities, and the European Regional Development Fund of the European Union (GPC2013-017) ** E-mails: [email protected], xianavc@ yahoo.es José Manuel sabucedo, Xiana Vilas 830 Un i v e r s i ta s Ps yc h o l o g i c a V. 13 No. 3 j U l io-s e P t i e m B r e 2014 Emotions form part of every human act, and without them there would be no social action (Jasper, 1998). This statement was aimed at supporting the reintroduction of emotions into explanatory theories for human behaviour. The belief that they would interfere in rational thought had led many authors to disregard them or play down their importance (Izard, 1972; Marcus, Neuman, & Mackuen, 2000). The field of political protest was not immune to this approach. In this case, it was thought that resorting to emotions to explain the protest placed their instrumental nature in question (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polleta, 2000). Despite that intellectual climate against emotions, Gamson (1992) postulated that anger was a key element for collective action, speaking collective action frames as the set of beliefs which legitimated the protest. These frames were those of injustice, identity and efficacy. Anger would be associated with the perception of injustice, one of the most powerful motives behind protest (Turner & Killian, 1987). Anger would play an important motivating role insofar as it “puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul” (Gamson, 1992, p. 32). Accordingly, Gamson is acknowledged with having recognised the role of emotions in the analysis of political protest, although it is true that he focused exclusively on that associated with the injustice frame, disregarding the fact that they may be related with the other two. Gamson’s proposal on the importance of anger in collective action was widely accepted. Indeed, the current principal explanatory models incorporate this emotion. Van Zomeren, Spears, Fisher, and Leach (2004) and van Stekelenburg, Klandermans, and van Dijk (2011) point out that anger has a direct bearing on participation, and Stürmer and Simon (2009) referred to its impact on collective action through identity. The importance of anger would seem to be beyond question. Thus, the matter that now needs to be addressed is whether the contribution of emotions to collective action must continue to be limited to this emotion, or should we consider the possible role of others. Once the prejudice which associated them with irrational behaviour has been overcome (Marcus et al., 2000; Marcus, McKuen, Wolak, & Keele, 2006), there is nothing to stop us analysing the influence of other emotions on collective action. But this entails adopting another perspective with regard to emotions and their relationship with behaviour. This is precisely what the Intergroup Emotions Theory ([IET]; Smith, 1993) did, asserting that emotions play a key role in understanding inter-group behaviour. The IET assumes two important theoretical approaches in social psychology. On one hand, the Social Identity Theory and Self-categorisation Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner & Killian, 1987), which point out that, on occasions, individuals act in line with the group whith which they identify; the higher the level of this identification, the more probable a response in group terms will be. On the other hand, the Cognitive Appraisal Theory posits that emotions are the response to a determined evaluation of the setting. This evaluation is obviously not unconnected with the situation in which each group finds itself. In society, inter-group power is asymmetrical and there are groups which find themselves in disadvantaged situations (social, economic, opportunities, etc.) with regard to others. This results in the generation of different interpretations regarding the causes of this situation, of how to react with respect to the same, and of the possibilities of modifying it. That is, individuals assess their setting and the resources they possess to deal with it (Frijda, 1988; Lazarus, 1984); emotions are thus going to depend on the meaning which individuals give to what happens around them. Forming part of a group considered to be unjustly treated must activate different evaluations, not only with respect to the present situation, but also of what is wished for with regard to the future. Except in case of fatalism (Martín-Baró, 1998), faced with the adverse situation they are experiencing, individuals and groups do not merely sit on the sidelines. On the contrary, they will attempt to modify certain conditions they perceive as illegitimate. This means that not only do they focus on the negative conditions in which they find themselves, but they will also evaluate doing something to change them and the possibility of achieving it. Thus, the IET would not only explain group-based anger (van Anger And Positive emotions in PoliticAl Protest Un i v e r s i ta s Ps yc h o l o g i c a V. 13 No. 3 j U l io-s e P t i e m B r e 2014 831 Zomeren et al., 2004), but also other group-based emotions associated with other participation-related processes. Besides stressing that anger is not the only emotion which may be important for explaining collective action, it should also be remembered that emotions are closely related with the tendency towards action (Frijda, 1988; Maitner, Mackie, & Smith, 2006; Taylor, 1995). This means that they are of special interest in political protest, as individuals involved in acts of this type must assume the different types of costs associated to this behavior (Klandermans, 1984). In this case, emotions would help to overcome them. The inclusion of other emotions into the analysis of political protest may provide us with a new approach to the dynamics and protagonists thereof. Numerous studies have shown that those who protest do so through anger. But is this the only emotion felt by those who decide to take to the streets demanding what they believe is just? Along with anger, there must be other emotions linked to participation. In the literature on collective action, we find a number of studies alluding to different emotions. Jasper (1998), offers an extensive list in which, in addition to anger and other negative emotions, he also refers to others of a positive nature, including pride and hope. Kemper (1978), in turn, alludes to a series of emotions which derive from the type of power and status relationships existing between groups. On the basis of current perception and on the expectations of these inter-group relations, negative emotions (such as anger) or positive emotions (satisfaction, pride, optimism or hope) would be generated. Hence, it is not only emotions of a negative nature, such as anger, which can encourage protest. In recent years, there has been increasing interest in the analysis of positive emotions in group action; one of those which has aroused most interest is hope. According to Jarymowicz and Bar-Tal (2006), hope is related with the expectation that desirable phenomena will happen. The anticipation that the objectives established will be attainable activates hope, and this encourages involvement in the protest. Thus, an emotional climate of hope may provide support for prolonged, targeted group activity in the future (Bar-Tal, Halperin, & de Rivera, 2007). It should be mentioned that in order for this emotion to come about, there is no need for action or confirmation of success: the mere anticipation of success will suffice. Páez, Javaloy, Wlodarczy, Espelt, and Rimé (2013) stress that this emotion emerges “when the worst is feared, but one trusts in obtaining the best or least worst” (p. 22). Another of the positive emotions is optimism. Kemper (1978, 1991) alluded to optimism and hope as emotions linked to the anticipation of an improvement in the in-group’s status or power. Culver, Carver, & Scheier (2003) and Librán (2002), associated it with the expectation of obtaining positive results. Another of the emotions is pride (Goodwin et al., 2000); this emotion can be considered from two perspectives. The Social Identity Theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979) that shows us that individuals belonging to aggrieved groups and who feel highly identified with them, will mobilise in order to change that state of affairs. Nonetheless, this mobilisation will be more probable when a politicised (Simon & Klandermans, 2001) or mobilised identity is activated (Sabucedo, Durán, & Alzate; 2010). That is, when individuals assume that their situation depends on their group’s power relations with certain out-groups, and these relations can only be changed through political action. Pride also appears to be associated with the carrying-out of actions which are, socially, highly valued by individuals and by their setting (Tangey, Stuewig, & Mashek, 2007), such as acting in line with the values of the in-group. It would seem to be clear that positive emotions, such us hope, optimism and pride, can facilitate political protest. These three emotions would be related with the need to act in order to improve the situation of the in-group. In this sense, they are linked to the act of participating itself. Above, we asked ourselves whether anger alone was capable of activating and maintaining a collective action. Now we have a possible answer. Anger has this mobilising force, but it undoubtJosé Manuel sabucedo, Xiana Vilas 832 Un i v e r s i ta s Ps yc h o l o g i c a V. 13 No. 3 j U l io-s e P t i e m B r e 2014 edly requires those other positive emotions which we have commented on. These can constructively channel the anger arising from the in-group’s adverse situation in an organised action. This means that, despite their different valences, negative and positive emotions need not be incompatible, as Wolpe (1958) and Fredrickson (2001) believed. On the contrary, in the specific case of mobilisation, it is the presence of both types of emotions which may increase the intention to participate. In order to gain a greater insight into the role played by emotions, the main objective of this study is to analyse the relationship between anger, positive emotions and protest. To this end, we raise two specific questions: a) The relationship between positive emotions and anger must be positive; and both variables will have a significant bearing on the intention to participate in protest actions; b) In addition to the independent, direct effect of each of the variables on intention to participate, anger may have an indirect effect through positive emotions. The study was conducted between January and February 2012, at which juncture the Spanish political and social setting was strongly affected by the financial crisis. Within the government’s policy of cutbacks, various adjustment measures were proposed with regard to education. These included raising university fees, which led to an important mobilisation among university students.