The Federalism Implications of Campaign Finance Regulation

Recent controversies in campaign finance have generated concerns that wealthy donors will dominate the political landscape, with Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission1 and McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission2 standing as the high-water marks in the U.S. Supreme Court’s jurisprudential turn towards deregulation. This short Essay puts this case law in perspective by briefly explaining how our system of federalism gives the states more authority than Congress to restrict campaign spending. Unlike the federal government, with its system of checks, balances, and “veto gates” that make it difficult to enact legislation, states have a more compelling interest in countering the appearance of corruption and accounting for the distorting influence that money can have in skewing public debate over policies. Because of direct democracy, in particular, these policies are easier to enact than federal law and therefore are more susceptible to being co-opted by special interests.3 While this Essay takes no position on the