Aggregation , Partiality , and the

Aggregation, Partiality, and the Strong Beneficence Principle Dale Dorsey Department of Philosophy University of Alberta 4-115 Humanities Centre Edmonton, Alberta Canada T6G 2E5 [email protected] The moral philosophy literature has, of late, been flush with discussion pro and con of the Strong Beneficence Principle: Strong Beneficence Principle (SBP): Persons of affluent means ought to give to those who might fail basic human subsistence until the point at which they must give up something of comparable moral importance. My statement of the Strong Beneficence Principle is very much in keeping with the tradition of Peter Singer’s monumentally influential piece, “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” in which a version of SBP is defended. SBP, and principles very much like it, have been discussed at length—the traditional worry, which has been further developed and refined recently, concerns the demandingness of SBP. As it is traditionally interpreted (and as was recognized even by Singer), SBP is a very demanding principle of beneficence; critics charge that SBP requires agents to give far more than might be thought reasonable. My worry about SBP is different. I argue in this paper that SBP cannot be interpreted in a plausible way. At issue is the “comparable moral importance” clause. In particular, I will ask whether this clause is to be treated as aggregative. When calculating the comparative moral importance of some sacrifice to the donor and benefits to potential recipients, are we to sum the interests of all persons who stand to be benefited? There are only three answers to this question, none of which is plausible. Requiring aggregation appears to entail a principle of beneficence