Phenomenology and Situated Action

Situated Action, the newest approach to Artificial Intelligence (AI), is in need of a coherent theoretical foundation both to support it and to unify its proponents. To that end, we believe that the work Merleau-Ponty wilt prove invaluable. In the past, Heideggcr’s work has been referred to from time to time in Situated Action literature. Hoxvever, we believe that Merleau-Ponty’s work is better suited to Situated Action, as it is heavily grounded in both biology and psychology. In addition, Mcrleau-Ponty broke with traditional Phenomenology for many of the sanae reasons that Situated Action researchers have broken xdth traditional AI. As a result, we believe that Merleau-Pontv’s work is demonstrably better suited for constructing a theoretical foundation for Situated Action. In Situated Action literature it is not unheard of to see references to Heidegger (Beer 1990; Brooks 1990), however it is exceedingly rare to see Phenomenology explicitly incorporated into Situated Action. We believe that this situation is problematic for two reasons: the first is the reluctance to incorporate Phenomenology into Situated Action, and the second is the choice of phenomenologists. Phenomenology has a great deal to offer to AI, but until now it has only been used to criticize AI (Winograd and Flores 1986; Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1990a; Dreyfus 1990b; Dreyfus 1979). With the birth of Situated Action, however, it is possible to bring phenomenology to bear on AI in a positive way. To that end, we believe that it is Merleau-Ponty, and not Heidegger, who is best suited to this task. Although Heidegger is more well known than Merleau-Ponty, his work tends to take place at an abstract level (Heidegger 1962, 1991) and as a result a considerable amount of effort must be spent applying his work to specific individuals. In addition, Heidegger’s work deals with people (Dasein]) rather than intelligent agents in general; therefore a significant amount of effort must once again be spent extending this work so as to make it applicable to i Roughly translated Dasein means: to be the occasion on which the world comes into being. Situated Action insofar as Situated Action is concerned with intelligent systems in general. In contrast to Heidegger, and indeed all other phenomenologists, Merleau-Ponty’s work is immediately applicable to Situated Action and is easily incorporated into it. What makes Merleau-Ponty’s unique in phenomenology is its scientific grounding. One of Merleau-Ponty’s chief dissatisfactions with phenomenology is that it posits a consciousness that is divorced from the corporeal world. MerleauPonty’s goal was to ground consciousness in the body and to develop the notion of an incarnate cogito, (insofar as cognition is part of our conscious life it too must be grounded in the body). For Merleau-Ponty it is not that bodies have consciousness, but rather that bodies are conscious. For Merleau-Ponty it is, in some sense, bodies and not merely minds that are cognitive. This dissatisfaction, and his resulting work, parallels the criticisms that Situated Action theorists have leveled against traditional AI and the solutions that have been proposed; viz. that it is a mistake to treat cognition as being independent of embodiment and that the proper course of action is to begin with a study of embodiment. While Merleau-Ponty’s work moves from consciousness down to embodiment in an attempt to ground consciousness (and cognition) the body, Situated Action moves from the body up to cognition in an attempts to get intelligence to emerge from bodily interaction. As a result, Merleau-Ponty’s work and that of Situated Action are reciprocal and complementary. Their union might also make possible a symbiotic relationship, while Merleau-Ponty’s philosophical work could be used in the theoretical development of Situated Action, Situated Action could be used to provide empirical validation for Merleau-Ponty’s theories. Both Merleau-Ponty and Situated Action have developed positions that are in keeping with Mies van der Rohe’s famous dictum "form follows function’’ and in both cases the positions espoused were reactions to traditional approaches in their respective fields. Phenomenologists from Husserl onward have focused on consciousness and its relation to the external world, either ignoring the body entirely or treating it as a delimiter. The fact that consciousness 78 From: AAAI Technical Report FS-96-02. Compilation copyright © 1996, AAAI (www.aaai.org). All rights reserved.