Doing Without Believing Skill, Intellectualism, and Knowledge-How
نویسندگان
چکیده
The debate between Intellectualists and Anti-Intellectualists on the nature of ‘knowledge-how’ has thus far centered on arguments from the syntax or semantics of natural languages, surveys of folk judgments, and appeals to intuitions about hypothetical cases. We propose a new approach, focusing on real-world cases found in the empirical psychology literature. Our argument is simple: while the hypothetical cases found in the philosophical literature are underspecified in crucial respects, an analogous set of real-world cases are not so underspecified. These cases speak strongly against Intellectualism, or the position that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that.
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Doing without believing: Intellectualism, knowledge-how, and belief-attribution
We consider a range of cases—both hypothetical and actual—in which agents apparently know how to φ but fail to believe that the way in which they in fact φ is a way for them to φ. These “no-belief” cases present a prima facie problem for Intellectualism about knowledge-how. The problem is this: if knowledge-that entails belief, and if knowing how to φ just is knowing that some w is a way for on...
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