Cantor’s Diagonal Argument: an Extension to the Socialist Calculation Debate
نویسنده
چکیده
would like to thank Mark Watson for correcting a mistake in his summary of Cantor’s argument. 1A note on citations: Mises’s article appeared in German in 1920. An English translation, “Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth,” appeared in Hayek’s (1990) collection Collectivist Economic Planning in 1935. 2The current paper assumes a basic familiarity with the socialist calculation debate. An extensive (and excellent) analysis is Lavoie (1981). CANTOR’S DIAGONAL ARGUMENT: AN EXTENSION TO THE SOCIALIST CALCULATION DEBATE
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