From Imperial Army to Bundeswehr: Continuity and Change in the Role of the Military in German History

Twentieth-century Germany’s (military) history has been the subject of heated, sometimes acrimonious controversies in the Federal Republic. In recent years, historians and the German public have been engaged, for example, in debates over the relative merit of different kinds of German resistance against National Socialism, and over the place of deserters in German history of the Second World War. Such soul-searching has culminated in angry debates over the role of the Wehrmacht in crimes against humanity which followed in the wake of the exhibition ‘Verbrechen der Wehrmacht ’ (crimes of the Wehrmacht) in Austria and Germany. The books under consideration here all have a contribution to make to our understanding of this troubled and contested past, and in particular to the question of the role of the military in German history. Willensmenschen highlights the role of officers in German history, emphasizing in particular the continuities that existed between the Wilhelmine army, the Reichswehr, Wehrmacht, and Bundeswehr. The contributions focus on officers in nineteenthand twentieth-century Germany, highlighting continuities in their mentalities and social standing. Indeed, the same men often occupied leading military roles in successive German armies, having been able to make the transition, despite lost wars, into the army that took the place of the defeated one. Against this background, and given Germany’s responsibility for the outbreak of two world wars, it is no exaggeration if the editors ofWillensmenschen claim that ‘ [t]he Germans can probably not be understood without their officers ’ (p. 10). The collection attempts to illuminate, and to some extent explain, the officer in German history – his self-perception, and perception by society, the traditions and the continuities in his role, attitudes, and behaviour. The elevation of the Schlieffen Plan to a near-certain recipe for victory is a good example of the myths that were created around the German army and its officers. Together with the myth of the stab in the back and a German army that had been ‘undefeated at the front ’, it aimed to preserve the greatness of the Imperial army that had been for so long the foundation of German military thinking. Another telling example is Bernd Ulrich’s account of the ‘heroic ’ death of Ernst Lindemann, commander of the Bismarck, who met his end on board the sinking vessel standing to attention with a military The Historical Journal, 47, 1 (2004), pp. 187–193 f 2004 Cambridge University Press DOI: 10.1017/S0018246X03003571 Printed in the United Kingdom