Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited
نویسنده
چکیده
Buchanan and Tullock’s original trade-off model of constitutional design is used to analyze how constitutional design affects post-constitutional rent seeking, and, in turn, how the anticipation of postconstitution rent seeking should lead to modification of constitutional design—specifically with respect to imposing and maintaining effective (composite) supermajority decision rules. JEL classification: D7, H1.
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