Impacts of Incentive Contracts for Tour Guides on Service Quality under Asymmetric Information
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چکیده
Tour guide plays an important role for achieving the overall service quality of a tourism supply chain. The service quality of tour guide can be improved by promoting service effort & service ability that are asymmetric information to travel agency. Two types of incentive contracts are commonly used by travel agency to motivate tour guide improving the service quality. These are a pooling contract distinguishing service efforts and a menu contract distinguishing service efforts and service abilities. The results of analyzing and simulating show that the menu contract dominates the pooling contract. The menu contract can not only screen service abilities of tour guide, but also motivate tour guide to improve service efforts. Moreover, in menu contract, the utilities of travel agency are increased, the employment of tour guide can be improved, the relation between travel agency and tour guide is strengthened and the service quality of tourism is enhanced.
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