The Role of Political Parties in Electoral Competition

This paper analyzes the role of political parties in electoral competition. A generalization of the Alesina (1988) model of electoral competition is proposed and estimated using data from the U.S. House of Representatives. The main extension is the reconsideration of the role of bargaining in the context of political parties. Results from the axiomatic bargaining literature are used to establish testable hypotheses regarding the effect of party representation on relevant parameters of the model including incumbency advantage. The model is estimated and tested using a regression discontinuity design. The predictions of the theoretical model developed here are only partially supported by the data. In particular, there is an increase in the incumbency advantage of the party at the district level while there does not seem to be any variation in the effect of party affiliation. A related implication of the results presented here is that the effect of election on policy outcomes increases with the representation of the party in congress. These results indicate that further analysis of the bargaining process and the role of political parties in electoral competition may provide a more comprehensive understanding of the effect of elections on policy outcomes. ∗Email: [email protected] †I thank Enrico Moretti for allowing me access to his data and programs. This paper benefitted from discussions with Charlie Gibbons, Shachar Kariv, Santiago Oliveros, Jasjeet Sekhon, and Gérard Roland. Remaining errors are my own.