Subjectivism, physicalism, or none of the above? Comments on Ross's "The location problem for color subjectivism".

In “The Location Problem for Color Subjectivism,” Peter Ross argues against what he calls subjectivism — the view that “colors are not describable in physical terms, ... [but are] mental processes or events of visual states” (2), and in favor of physicalism — a view according to which colors are “physical properties of physical objects, such as reflectance properties” (10). He rejects an argument that has been offered in support of subjectivism, and argues that, since no form of subjectivism is able to account for our perception of color, we are better off adopting physicalism. In these comments, I won’t remark on the details of the interesting (and, to my mind, largely persuasive) arguments that Ross marshals against subjectivism, but instead will focus on the argument in favor of subjectivism that he considers and rejects (henceforth, the subjectivist’s argument). I want to agree with half of what Ross says about the subjectivist’s argument. Specifically, I’ll agree with him that subjectivism is unpalatable, and I’ll join him in finding fault with the subjectivist’s argument (§1). However, I want to claim that Ross’s way out of that argument carries equally unacceptable costs (§2), and that there are more attractive ways of avoiding color subjectivism than those he considers (§3).