Belief-free rationalizability and informational robustness
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 17 December 2016 Available online 10 July 2017 JEL classification: C72 C79 D82 D83
منابع مشابه
BELIEF-FREE RATIONALIZABILITY AND INFORMATIONAL ROBUSTNESS By
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 104 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017