Bargaining, Values and Implementation with Coalitional Externalities
نویسندگان
چکیده
The paper starts by proposing an explicit and intuitive bargaining process to analyze coalitional externalities, which we then use to generate a value allocation extending the Shapley value to partition function from games, the Rational Belief Shapley value (RBS). We investigate the strategic foundation of the value by constructing a mechanism implementing it. It extends existing models of multilateral bargaining by allowing players much more freedom to form coalitions, and provides a flexible framework for the analysis of coalitional externalities. Alternative negotiation processes lead to other “Shapley-like” values, which are implemented by modified versions of the previous mechanism. JEL classification codes: C71; C72; D62.
منابع مشابه
Rational bargaining in games with coalitional externalities
This paper provides a flexible strategic framework to analyze bargaining and values in environments with coalitional externalities. Within this framework we propose a new value that extends the Shapley value to partition function form games, the so-called Rational Belief Shapley (RBS) value. We investigate the strategic foundation of the RBS value by constructing an implementation mechanism. Th...
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