Does uncertainty lead to sincerity? Simple and complex voting mechanisms
نویسندگان
چکیده
We ask whether the absence of information about other voters’ preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere. We start by classifying voting mechanisms as simple and complex according to the number of message types voters can use to elect alternatives. We show that while the elimination of information about other voters’ preferences allows optimal voting to be interpreted as sincere for simple voting mechanisms, this is no longer always true for complex ones. In complex voting mechanisms, voters’ optimal strategy may vary with the size of the electorate. Therefore, in order to interpret optimal voting as sincere for complex voting mechanisms, we describe the optimal voting strategy when voters not only have no information but also have no pivotal power, i.e., as the size of the electorate tends to infinity. JEL codes: D63, D71, D72, D80
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Social Choice and Welfare
دوره 33 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2009