Normative Predicates and Vagueness

Almost every theory of vagueness shares at least one feature: it uses, and in most cases heavily relies on, some kind of normative predicate (or predicates) in its metalanguage. Metalinguistic normative predicates are discussed chiefly by supervaluationists and other defenders of higher-order vagueness. According to this group of theorists, the existence of higher-order vagueness depends on and is explained by the vagueness of predicates like " definitely x ". However, the question of how to characterize these predicates has wider interest. The vagueness of metalinguistic normative predicates may seem particularly worrisome to theorists who insist that the metalanguage used to describe a theory of vagueness be precise. In general, however, both for those who accept metalinguistic vagueness and for those who deny it, even in ordinary language normative predicates are difficult to classify. If they are not vague, what are they? If they are precise, how do you explain the possibility of generating a sorites paradox with them? Is a different solution to the paradox necessary for this class of predicates? Normative predicates differ from standardly vague predicates such as tall and red in that their extensions are not arbitrary, that is, do not permit of multiple standards of application. A non-normatively vague predicate (tall, red) would not usually engender a heated debate about its application because its vagueness is widely recognized. But a normative modification of a claim involving a vague predicate (such as the claim that Bill is definitely tall – not just tall – or that Sally's hair color mandates the description red – not just that Sally's hair is red) is different. Two or more competent speakers of the language in which these claims are made would not debate these normatively modified claims; at the first sign of disagreement, they would have to withdraw the normative modification. For example, they would concede that Bill is tall according to one of them, but to the other he seems average, and so instead of being definitely tall they would say he is on the tall side or even tall compared to most people. As a matter of fact, this very feature of normative predicates (that they do not permit of multiple standards of application, and hence do not allow for disagreement) explains why they get used so often in theories of vagueness. Normative modifications seem to eliminate the vagueness of vague predicates because they imply a kind of …