Erkki Koskela * − Rune
نویسندگان
چکیده
We analyze the impact of entrepreneurship as an outside option on compensation contracts between a principal and an agent with bargaining power. In the first stage the parties bargain over the base wage and the profit share. In the second stage the principal determines the capital investment and the agent decides on effort. It is shown that while negotiated base wage increases in the degree of the competitiveness in the market for outside equity funding, the profit share is invariant both to the imperfections prevailing in the equity market and to the relative bargaining power of the negotiating parties.
منابع مشابه
Erkki Koskela * - Rune Stenbacka * * PROFIT SHARING , CREDIT MARKET IMPERFECTIONS AND EQUILIBRIUM UNEMPLOYMENT
We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. Our analysis highlights the critical role of the outside option available of employees for the evaluation of the employment implications of intensified credit market competition. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargaining...
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We investigate the interaction between labour and credit market imperfections for equ ilibrium unemployment in the presence of profit sharing. Our analysis highlights the critical role of the outside option available of employees for the evaluation of the employment implications of intensified credit market competition. In a partial equilibrium with exogenous outside options increased bargainin...
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