Asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms
نویسنده
چکیده
We describe the construction and analysis of asymmetric Cost Sharing mechanisms, in which a variety of axioms are applied to subsets of the agents/goods. We show that the analysis can be quite subtle as apparently similar axiomatizations lead to significantly different results; in particular, combinations of symmetric mechanisms can be extremely asymmetric and biased. In addition, we characterize some interesting mixed mechanisms.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 75 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2012