Aumann-Shapley Values on a Class of Cooperative Fuzzy Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
This paper defines a class of cooperative fuzzy games with infinite players, which is monotonically nondecreasing and continuous with respect to each player’s grade of membership. Then, the AumannShapley values for the games with fuzzy coalitions are proposed with the form of Choquet integral. The properties of the Aumann-Shapley values are also shown. Finally, the relationship between the fuzzy Aumann-Shapley value and the fuzzy Shapley function is given. c ⃝2012 World Academic Press, UK. All rights reserved.
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