Bayesian Persuasion with Private Information∗
نویسنده
چکیده
We study a model of communication and Bayesian persuasion between a sender who is privately informed and has state independent preferences, and a receiver who has preferences that depend on the unknown state. In a model with two states of the world, over the interesting range of parameters, the equilibria can be pooling or separating, but a particular novel refinement forces the pooling to be on the most informative information structure in all but one case. We also study two extensions a model with more information structures as well as a model where the state of the world is non-dichotomous, and show that analogous results emerge. JEL Classification: D82, D83, C72.
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