Symmetry and impartial lotteries
نویسنده
چکیده
A prize is to be randomly assigned to some agent, so each agent designates one of his peers on a ballot. The ballots determine the lottery which selects the winner, and impartiality requires that no agent’s report impacts his own chance of winning. The primary results are (1) a characterization of all impartial rules which treat agents symmetrically as voters and (2) a characterization of all impartial rules which treat agents symmetrically as candidates. Each rule in either class randomly selects from a finite set of simple rules. Corollaries include a known constant rule impossibility, a new dictatorship impossibility, and the first axiomatic characterization of the rule which randomly selects one of the ballots using the uniform distribution proposed by Holzman and Moulin (2013).
منابع مشابه
Generalized Utilitarianism and Harsanyi’s Impartial Observer Theorem1 by Simon Grant,
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 94 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2015