Second-order freeriding on antisocial punishment restores the effectiveness of prosocial punishment
نویسندگان
چکیده
Attila Szolnoki1, ∗ and Matjaž Perc2, 3, 4, † Institute of Technical Physics and Materials Science, Centre for Energy Research, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, P.O. Box 49, H-1525 Budapest, Hungary Faculty of Natural Sciences and Mathematics, University of Maribor, Koroška cesta 160, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia CAMTP – Center for Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics, University of Maribor, Mladinska 3, SI-2000 Maribor, Slovenia Complexity Science Hub, Josefstädterstraße 39, A-1080 Vienna, Austria
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