Steady states in matching and bargaining
نویسنده
چکیده
We establish the existence of steady states in two classic matching and bargaining models with general trader asymmetries, search processes, and production functions. © 2016 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. JEL classification: C78
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- J. Economic Theory
دوره 167 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2017