Principles of Religious Prosociality: A Review and Reformulation

Historically, religion and religious belief have often been credited as the source of human morality. But what have been the real effects of religion on prosocial behavior? A review of the psychological literature reveals a complex relation between religious belief and moral action: leading to greater prosocial behavior in some contexts but not in others, and in some cases actually increasing antisocial behavior. In addition, different forms of religious belief are associated with different styles of co-operation. This body of evidence paints a somewhat messy picture of religious prosociality; however, recent examinations of the cognitive mechanisms of belief help to resolve apparent inconsistencies. In this article, we review evidence of two separate sources of religious prosociality: a religious principle associated with the protection of the religious group, and a supernatural principle associated with the belief in God, or other supernatural agents. These two principles emphasize different prosocial goals, and so have different effects on prosocial behavior depending on the target and context. A re-examination of the literature illustrates the independent influences of religious and supernatural principles on moral action. What is the relation between prosocial behavior and religion? Religion is often seen as the source of morality, with absolute rules of right and wrong handed down by God, and (literally) set in stone. Secularism and atheism are frequently criticized as amoral, that a religious foundation is necessary for a moral foundation (e.g., Robertson, 1986). On the surface, the lesson treat others as we would like to be treated (i.e., the ‘Golden Rule’) seems to be a prominent narrative throughout nearly all major world religions (e.g., Jesus’ parable of the Good Samaritan emphasizing the virtues of outgroup prosociality, Luke 10: 25–37, King James Version; Bahá’u’lláh calling on his followers to ‘desire not for anyone the things you would not desire for yourselves,’ Gleanings from the Writings of Bahá’u’lláh, LXVI; Effendi, 1976; or Lao-Tzu’s description of ‘true goodness’ as doing good both to those who are and are not good themselves, Tao-Te Ching; Mitchell, 2006). But it may be unwise to accept these theological ideals as religious directives, or suppose that these teachings translate into actual behavior. One may just as easily find passages that prescribe the opposite (e.g., ‘Eye for an eye,’ Leviticus 24: 19–21). Critics argue that religion has also been a source of violence and intolerance, citing vivid examples of terrorist acts and holy wars (e.g., Dawkins, 2006; Harris, 2006). Indeed, a great deal of theory and research suggests that not only does religiousness fail to reliably predict universal helping behavior (e.g., Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993) but also that it is a mistake to even hold such an expectation (e.g., Graham & Haidt, 2010; Saroglou, 2006; Wilson, 2002). Given the abstractness of religious beliefs, the broad social functions of religion, and the diverse conceptualization of supernatural agents, it is perhaps not surprising that the relation between religion and moral action is not straightforward. Rather, religious belief is associated with multiple moral goals that may guide moral behavior in conflicting directions. Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/8 (2010): 574–590, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00286.x a 2010 The Authors Journal Compilation a 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd The goals of this article are twofold. In the first half, we provide an updated review of the psychological literature that has investigated the relation between religion and prosocial behavior. We bring together classic and contemporary research measuring the effects of individual differences in religiosity, as well as more recent research utilizing experimental manipulations of religious cognition (for additional perspectives on these topics, see Batson et al., 1993; Bering & Johnson, 2005; Hansen & Norenzayan, 2006; Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Johnson & Bering, 2006; Norenzayan & Shariff, 2008). Second, on the basis of this review, we argue that religious cognitions guide moral action through two separate but related moral principles: a religious principle, in which the primary moral concern is for ingroup protection and co-operation, and a supernatural principle, where the primary moral concern is deference to God (or other supernatural agents). Throughout this discussion, we focus on the target of prosocial behavior, specifically, whether the potential target of prosocial behavior is considered a member of the religious ingroup or outgroup. The distinction between the supernatural and religious principles is highlighted by the difference in pattern of prosociality toward these different targets. In the end, we hope to provide a deeper scientific understanding of the multifaceted nature of ‘religious’ cognitions and their consequences for moral action. Individual Differences in Religiosity Religion is not a variable that researchers can easily manipulate, and so the majority of psychological studies of religion and prosocial behavior have combined laboratory studies with correlational methods on individual measures of religiousness. In this section, we review how this research has evolved in its study of different forms, or styles, of religious belief (e.g., intrinsic versus extrinsic; literal versus symbolic). We find that there is more to religious belief than the strength of one’s convictions, and that different styles of religiousness lead to different patterns of prosociality. Intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest orientations Early studies focused on the relation between religion and prejudice, which can be broadly defined as negative attitudes toward an outgroup. Although prejudice is neither prosocial nor antisocial behavior per se, it is an important factor for predicting hostility or co-operation with others. Allport and Kramer (1946) found that students who reported an affiliation with Catholic or Protestant churches were more likely to hold ethnically prejudiced views than students who reported no religious affiliation. Stouffer (1955) similarly found that frequent religious attendance predicted more intolerance for groups holding different ideologies (e.g. socialism, atheism). But soon thereafter, Allport suggested that the broad classification of religious was an oversimplification, and instead made an effort to distinguish between two types of religious motivation – intrinsic and extrinsic – that could more accurately describe the relation between religiosity and prejudice (e.g., Allport & Ross, 1967). In Allport’s terms, the intrinsically motivated believer was said to ‘live’ their religion as an end-in-itself, whereas the extrinsically motivated believer was said to ‘use’ their religion as a means to establish security, status, or social support (Allport & Ross, 1967; Allport, 1966). With this distinction, Allport argued that only extrinsically religious people tended to be more prejudiced, whereas there was no such relation for those who were intrinsically motivated (Allport, 1966). Principles of Religious Prosociality 575 a 2010 The Authors Social and Personality Psychology Compass 4/8 (2010): 574–590, 10.1111/j.1751-9004.2010.00286.x Journal Compilation a 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd Daniel Batson and colleagues have since extended the work of Allport in two important ways. First, Batson reconceptualized the intrinsic orientation as a more dogmatic identification with the activities, practices, and literal beliefs of their religion (Batson, 1976). Second, Batson introduced another dimension of religiosity – a quest orientation characterized by the search for existential meaning (Batson, 1976). In one classic experiment, Darley and Batson (1973) re-created the situation portrayed in the parable of the Good Samaritan to determine whether religiosity predicts helping an unknown stranger. Participants in this study were on their way to give a speech about the parable of the Good Samaritan, and on their way passed a shabbily dressed confederate hunched over in an alley – possibly in need of help. Much to the chagrin of those championing religion as a force for good, none of the three dimensions of religiosity (intrinsic, extrinsic, or quest) predicted helping behavior. Instead, the only factor that made a difference was whether people were in a hurry or not (Darley & Batson, 1973; Batson, 1976). But, further analysis of the results revealed that the kind of religious orientation held by participants affected the kind of help one was likely to give. Participants who scored high on the quest dimension were more likely to offer help of a tentative nature, that is, they only helped if the target seemed to want help. In contrast, people high on intrinsic religiousness who offered help were more insistent in their assistance (Batson, 1976; see also Batson & Gray, 1981). Follow-up research focused on the distinction between quest and intrinsic orientations as they related to ‘true’ altruism. In a study of racial prejudice (Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, & Pych, 1986), white participants were asked to choose between two theaters to watch a movie: one where they would have to sit beside a white student, or one where they would have to sit next to a black student. Important, however, for some participants the two theaters were playing the same movie, and so decisions to sit next to the fellow white student (over the black students) appeared overtly prejudice. But in another condition the theaters played two different movies, so the decision could also be construed as a preference for the movie, not the white or black student. Intrinsically religious participants were only likely to sit with the black student when the movies were the same (i.e., when the choice could not have been attributed to movie preference and they only wanted to appear nonbiased), whereas quest-oriented participants were more likely to sit with the black student whether the movie was the same or not (Batson et al., 1986).