Strategic Disclosure of Collective Actions
نویسندگان
چکیده
The paper illustrates how decision makers may have an incentive to withhold information regarding the existence of Pareto improving collective actions. The resulting level of inefficiency varies with the way compromises are reached when the parties have to choose among multiple options. Various reasonable compromise rules can be ranked unequivocally, and a rule resulting in a minimal level of inefficiency is identified. Qualitative results extend to sequential disclosure. Enforcing a hard deadline for disclosure may be welfare improving in some circumstances.
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