Rent-setting in multiple winner rent-seeking contests
نویسندگان
چکیده
In this paper, we analyze a multiple winner rent-seeking contest where the number of winners is set by a self-interested regulator. The winners receive a license to compete in a market. The structure of competition in the market influences the number of winners through the preferences of the regulator. The model indicates that Cournot competitors can be better off than firms that are able to collude on output determination. q 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved. JEL classification: D72
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