Text Message Price Gouging: A Perfect Storm of Tacit Collusion
نویسنده
چکیده
INTRODUCTION ................................................................................... 217 I. TEXT MESSAGE PRICING ......................................................... 218 A. History of Text Message Pricing ............................................ 218 B. Text Messaging Price Comparison ......................................... 220 II. TEXT MESSAGING MARKET BACKGROUND .......................... 223 III. COMPETITIVE, MONOPOLY, AND OLIGOPOLY MARKETS ... 225 IV. ANTITRUST LAW AND THE OLIGOPOLY PROBLEM .............. 227 A. The Scope of Agreement Under the Sherman Act ..................... 227 B. Economics-Based Approaches to Antitrust Enforcement........... 230 V. ANTITRUST ANALYSIS OF TEXT MESSAGING ........................ 231 A. Text Messaging Market Definition ....................................... 231 B. An Economic Analysis of the Text Messaging Market ............. 233 1. The Text Messaging Market’s Susceptibility to Collusion ....................................................................... 234 2. Direct Economic Evidence of Collusion in the Text Messaging Market ......................................................... 238 VI. FCC REGULATION OF TEXT MESSAGE PRICING .................. 241 CONCLUSION ....................................................................................... 242
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- JTHTL
دوره 8 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2010