Perverse Incentives in Security Contracts: A Case Study in the Colombian Power Grid
نویسندگان
چکیده
In 2008 security forces in Colombia found that one of the companies hired to repair electric transmission towers from guerrilla attacks had hired guerrilla members to demolish towers in their contracted area of service. As a result, their business boomed as they were called often to repair electric towers. We model this problem as a game between contractors and the power transmission company, we show how misaligned incentives enabled contractors to profit by hiring guerrilla groups, and then model the changes to contracts that the transmission company implemented in order to minimize the incentives for future contractors to collude with guerrilla members in destroying electric towers.
منابع مشابه
ارزیاﺑﯽ اﻣﻨﯿﺖ ریزﺷﺒﮑﻪ ﻣﺴﺘﻘﻞ وﻟﺘﺎژ ﻣﺘﻮﺳﻂ دارای ﻣﻨﺎﺑﻊ ﺑﺎ واﺳﻂ اﻟﮑﺘﺮوﻧﯿﮏ ﻗﺪرت در ﺣﻀﻮر اﺧﺘﻼﻻت ﺗﻮان و ﺑﺎر ﺑﺎ اﺳﺘﻔﺎده از ﺷﺒﮑﻪ ﻋﺼﺒﯽ- ﻓﺎزی ﺗﻄﺒﯿﻘﯽ
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