Vaguely Motivated Cooperation
نویسنده
چکیده
The transferable utility (TU) cooperative games are used as an effective mathematical representation of cooperation and coalitions forming. This contribution deals with a modified form of such games in which the expected pay-offs of coalitions are known only vaguely, where the vagueness is modelled by means of fuzzy quantities and some other fuzzy set theoretical concepts. Such games were investigated in [8] and in some other papers. Their cores and Shapley values were analyzed and some of their basic properties were shown. This contribution is to extend that analysis, namely from the point of view of the motivation of players to cooperate in coalitions, as well as the relation between the willingness to cooperate and the ability to find the conditions under that the cooperation can be percepted as fair.
منابع مشابه
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE DISCUSSION PAPER NO.155 June 1993 CHINESE TOWNSHIP VILLAGE ENTERPRISES AS VAGUELY DEFINED COOPERATIVES
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