Forming societies and the Shapley NTU value
نویسنده
چکیده
We design a simple non-cooperative mechanism in the classs of NTUgames. We study it in the context of a particular class of pure exchange economies. When the corresponding NTU game (N, V ) satisfies that V (N) is flat, the only payoff which arises in equilibrium is the Shapley NTU value.
منابع مشابه
Forming societies and the Shapley NTU value1
We design a simple protocol of coalition formation. A society grows up by sequentially incorporating new members. The negotiations are always bilateral. We study this protocol in the context of non-transferable utility (NTU) games in characteristic function form. When the corresponding NTU game (N,V ) satisfies that V (N) is flat, the only payoff which arises in equilibrium is the Shapley NTU v...
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