Pii: S0010-0277(00)00137-2
نویسندگان
چکیده
Caramazza and Costa (Cognition 75 (2000) B51) reported results which demonstrate that a semantically related word distractor interferes in picture naming even when it is not in the response set and there is no possibility for mediated interference. They interpreted the results to be problematic for the model of lexical access proposed by Levelt, Roelofs, and Meyer (Behavioral and Brain Sciences 22 (1999) 1). Roelofs (this issue) argues that those results are not inconsistent with Levelt et al.'s model when certain new assumptions about the mechanism of lexical selection are considered. Here we show that even with these assumptions the model still makes the wrong predictions. We report new results which demonstrate that the semantic interference and facilitation effects that are obtained respectively in the basic-level and category-level naming variants of the picture±word interference paradigm are not the result of response set size and response repetitions. q 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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