The Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule with anonymous voters
نویسندگان
چکیده
The Condorcet winner in an election is the candidate that would be able to defeat each of the other candidates in a series of pairwise elections. The Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the conditional probability that it would elect the Condorcet winner, given that a Condorcet winner exists. A closed form representation is obtained for the Condorcet efficiency of Borda Rule in three candidate elections under the impartial anonymous culture condition. 2001 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Mathematical Social Sciences
دوره 41 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2001