Lecture 6 Moral Hazard: The Principal-Agent Model – Part I
نویسندگان
چکیده
Required reading: Chapter 6: Milgrom, Paul, and John Roberts, 1992, Economics, Organization and Management (PrenticeHall: London). Supplementary reading: *Sappington, David E. M., 1991, Incentives in principal-agent relationships, Journal of Economic Perspectives 5(2), 45-66. Chapter 4: Laffont, Jean-Jacques, and David Martimort, 2002, The Theory of Incentives: The Principal-Agent Model (Princeton University Press: Princeton, N.J.).
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