Evolutionary Stability in One-Parameter Models under Weak Selection
نویسنده
چکیده
A general notion of evolutionary stability is formulated in models in which the possible behaviours are parameterized by a continuous variable, and selection is assumed to be weak. Two local stability conditions are formulated, m-stability and &stability, the former being first-order and the latter second-order in the mutant behavioural deviation. The conditions are interpreted in two standard formulations of a one-locus genetic model: a covariance approach and a structured population approach. A weak selection theorem is proved which says that m-stability can be calculated using the neutral covariances. These in turn can be calculated as relatedness coefficients; hence an inclusive titness formulation is capable of checking m-stability. But d-stability, being second-order, is more difficult to handle. 6 1989
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