Some Bounds for the Banzhaf Index and Other Semivalues
نویسندگان
چکیده
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منابع مشابه
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Math. Oper. Res.
دوره 13 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 1988