Uniqueness of stationary equilibria in bargaining one-dimensional policies under (super) majority rules
نویسندگان
چکیده
Article history: Received 19 May 2009 Available online 2 February 2011 JEL classification: C78
منابع مشابه
Bargaining one-dimensional policies and the efficiency of super majority rules
We consider negotiations selecting one-dimensional policies. Individuals have single-peaked preferences, and they are impatient. Decisions arise from a bargaining game with random proposers and (super) majority approval, ranging from the simple majority up to unanimity. The existence and uniqueness of stationary subgame perfect equilibrium is established, and its explicit characterization provi...
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Games and Economic Behavior
دوره 73 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2011