Secret Correlation in Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring: The Need for Nonstationary Strategies

نویسنده

  • Yair Goldberg
چکیده

We characterize the maximum payoff that a team can guarantee against another in a class of repeated games with imperfect monitoring. Our result relies on the optimal trade-off for the team between optimization of stage-payoffs and generation of signals for future correlation. JEL classification: C72, D82 Date: 11th May 2004. 1

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عنوان ژورنال:
  • Math. Oper. Res.

دوره 32  شماره 

صفحات  -

تاریخ انتشار 2007