A note on the uniqueness of stable marriage matching
نویسنده
چکیده
In this note we present some sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of a stable matching in the Gale-Shapley marriage classical model of even size. We also state the result on the existence of exactly two stable matchings in the marriage problem of odd size with the same conditions.
منابع مشابه
On the uniqueness of stable marriage matchings
A sufficient condition for uniqueness is identified on the preferences in the marriage problem, i.e. two-sided one-to-one matching with non transferable utility. For small economies this condition is also necessary. This class of preferences is broad and they are of particular relevance in economic applications. 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved.
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ورودعنوان ژورنال:
- Discussiones Mathematicae Graph Theory
دوره 33 شماره
صفحات -
تاریخ انتشار 2013