Materialism : Matters of Definition , Defense , and Deconstruction

How should the metaphysical hypothesis of materialism be formulated? What strategies look promising for defending this hypothesis? How good are the prospects for its successful defense, especially in light of the infamous ‘‘hard problem’’ of phenomenal consciousness? I will say something about each of these questions. 1. FORMULATING MATERIALISM In seeking a satisfactory formulation of materialism, it helps to employ the notion of a possible world. Possible worlds are plausibly construed not literally as universes other than the single real universe (i.e. not as cosmoi), but rather as total ways the cosmos might be – i.e. maximal properties instantiable by the single real world (the single cosmos). On this usage, the item designated as the actual world – considered as one among the various possible worlds – is not itself the cosmos either, but rather is the total cosmos-instantiable property that is actually instantiated by the cosmos. But it will be convenient in practice to speak as though the actual world is the cosmos and as though other possible worlds are other such cosmoi – a harmless enough manner of speaking, as long as one bears in mind that it is not intended literally. (The various claims made below in terms of possible worlds can all be reformulated in terms of the language of maximal cosmos-instantiable properties, but I will not bother to do so.) Philosophical Studies (2006) 131:157–183 Springer 2006 DOI 10.1007/s11098-005-5987-x