Contractarianism Gone Wild: Carruthers and the Moral Status of Animals

In bis recent contribution to the literature on the moral status of animals, Peter Carruthers argues that "some version of contractualism provides us with the most acceptable framework for moral theory," and be defends two central claims about sucb a theory: that it provides "a theoretical framework that accords full moral standing to all human beings, while non-arbitrarily withholding such standing from animals," and that it can account for many common-sense beliefs about the treatment of animals, while at the same time providing "no support for those who would wish to extend still further the moral protection already available" to them.' I am not concemed here to question the merits either of contractarian2 moral theory in general, or of Carruthers' version of it in particular. Instead, I want to grant the acceptability of such a theory for the sake of the argument, and to challenge Carruthers' two crucial claims about it. First, I will argue that if moral contractarianism provides support for common-sense restrictions on our treatment of animals for the sorts of reasons that Carruthers develops, then it provides support for extending moral protection substantially beyond the level currently available to them; I will argue, in particular, that if Carruthers' arguments are successful, they also provide acontractarianjustification for morally criticizing the practice of factory farming, though this is meant merely as one example. Second, without attempting to settle the question of precisely which additional restrictions on our treatmentofanimals such contractarian arguments might ultimately be used to underwrite, I will argue that whatever principles are finally agreed to, they involve attributing to animals a moral standing that is just as "full" as the moral status such arguments accord to some humans.