On the Failure of Core Convergence in Economies with Asymmetric Information
نویسندگان
چکیده
In interim economies with asymmetric information, we show that the coarse core of Wilson (1978) does not converge to price equilibrium allocations as the economy is replicated. This failure of core convergence is a basic consequence of asymmetric information and extends to any reasonable notion of either (interim) core or price equilibrium. JEL Classification: C71, D51
منابع مشابه
Information Transmission and Core Convergence in Quasilinear Economies ∗
We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions and the incentive constraints are relevant. Specifically, we shall focus on the credible core and randomized mediated core concepts. We consider independent replicas of the basic economy: independent copies of th...
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We study core convergence in interim quasilinear economies with asymmetric information, concentrating on core notions in which information is transmitted endogenously within coalitions and the incentive constraints are relevant. Specifically, we shall focus on the credible core and randomized mediated core concepts. We consider independent replicas of the basic economy: independent copies of th...
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