On the General Argument Against Internalism Forthcoming in Synthese

I respond to John Greco’s argument that all forms of internalism in epistemology are either false or uninteresting. The paper divides into two sections. First, I explain precisely what internalists and externalists in epistemology disagree over. This puts us in a position to assess whether Greco’s argument succeeds. Second, I present Greco’s argument and offer two objections. 1. Internalism and Externalism More than one debate goes by the label ‘internalism/externalism’ in contemporary epistemology. All share one thing in common, namely, they concern the nature and grounds of evaluative epistemic properties, especially justification. The controversy ultimately turns on the correct answer to two questions. Where ‘E’ designates an 1 Among the sources that have informed my thinking on this are: Pollock (1986), Steup (1996), Conee and Feldman (2001: section I), Pryor