The Bounded Memory Folk Theorem∗
نویسندگان
چکیده
We show that the Folk Theorem holds for n-player discounted repeated game with bounded-memory pure strategies. Our result requires each player’s payoff to be strictly above the pure minmax payoff but requires neither time-dependent strategies, nor public randomization, nor communication. The type of strategies we employ to establish our result turn out to have new features that may be important in understanding repeated interactions. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72; C73; C79
منابع مشابه
George J . Mailath and Wojciech Olszewski “ Folk Theorems with Bounded Recall under ( Almost ) Perfect Monitoring ” Third Version PIER Working Paper 10 - 007
We prove the perfect-monitoring folk theorem continues to hold when attention is restricted to strategies with bounded recall and the equilibrium is essentially required to be strict. As a consequence, the perfect monitoring folk theorem is shown to be behaviorally robust under almost-perfect almost-public monitoring. That is, the same specification of behavior continues to be an equilibrium wh...
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