Core Discussion Paper 2001/30 Consistency, Converse Consistency, and Aspirations in Coalitional Games
نویسندگان
چکیده
In the problems of choosing “aspirations” for coalitional games, we study two axioms, “MW-consistency” and “converse MW-consistency”, introduced by Moldovanu and Winter (1994). We mainly consider two domains: the domain of all NTU games and the domain of all TU games. In particular, we study which subsolutions of the aspiration correspondence satisfy MW-consistency and/or converse MWconsistency. We also provide axiomatic characterizations of the aspiration kernel and the aspiration nucleolus on the domain of all TU games.
منابع مشابه
Consistency, converse consistency, and aspirations in TU-games
In problems of choosing ‘aspirations’ for TU-games, we study two axioms, ‘MW-consistency’ and ‘converse MW-consistency.’ In particular, we study which subsolutions of the aspiration correspondence satisfy MW-consistency and/or converse MW-consistency. We also provide axiomatic characterizations of the aspiration kernel and the aspiration nucleolus. 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.
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