Cooperation, Solution Concepts and Long-term Dynamics in the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma
نویسندگان
چکیده
Solution concepts help designing co-evolutionary algorithms by interfacing search mechanisms and problems. This work analyses co-evolutionary dynamics by coupling the notion of solution concept with a Markov chain model of coevolution. It is shown that once stationarity has been reached by the Markov chain, and given a particular solution concept of interest, the dynamics can be seen as a Bernoulli process describing how the algorithm visits solution and non-solution sets. A particular analysis is presented using the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. By numerically computing the Markov chain transition matrices and stationary distributions, a complex and strong relation between variation and selection is observed.
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