“fit”: Field Experimental Evidence on Sorting, Incentives and Creative Worker Performance

نویسندگان

  • Kevin J. Boudreau
  • Karim R. Lakhani
  • Jeff Davis
  • Elizabeth Richard
  • Jennifer Fogarty
  • Jack Hughes
  • Rob Hughes
  • Mike Lydon
  • Ira Heffan
  • Jessie Ford
  • Pierre Azoulay
  • Iain Cockburn
  • Peter Coles
  • Daniel Elfenbein
  • Silke Januszewski Forbes
  • Shane Greenstein
  • Nicola Lacetera
  • Mara Lederman
  • Joshua Lerner
  • Muriel Niederle
  • Gary Pisano
  • Al Roth
  • Sandra Slaughter
  • Scott Stern
  • Catherine Tucker
  • Eric von Hippel
  • Heidi Williams
  • Karim Lakhani
چکیده

We present the results of a 10-day field experiment in which over 500 elite software developers prepared solutions to the same computational algorithmic problem. Participants were divided into two groups with identical skills distributions and exposed to the same competitive institutional setting. The “sorted” group was composed of individuals who preferred the competitive regime instead of a team-based outside option. The “unsorted” group had population-average preferences for working in the regime or the outside option. We find this sorting on this basis of institutional preferences doubled effort and the performance of solutions—controlling for skills, monetary incentives and institutional details.

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Field Experimental Evidence on Sorting, Incentives and Creative Worker Performance

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تاریخ انتشار 2011