Core-equivalence for the Nash bargaining solution

Core equivalence and shrinking of the core results are well known for economies. The present paper establishes counterparts for bargaining economies, a specific class of production economies (finite and infinite) representing standard two-person bargaining games and their continuum counterparts as coalition production economies. Thereby we get core equivalence of the Nash solution. The results reconfirm the Walrasian approach to Nash bargaining of Trockel (1996). Moreover we establish the same speed of convergence as is known from Debreu (1975) and Grodal (1975) for replicated pure exchange economies and for regular purely competitive sequences of economies, respectively. ∗ This article is dedicated to Birgit Grodal, a friend since 30 years. Financial support of the DFG under grant #444 USA 111/2/03 is gratefully acknowledged. ∗∗ Address: Postfach 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld email: [email protected]